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STATE AID TO RELIGIOUS-AFFILIATED SCHOOLS: A
POLITICAL ANALYSIS
MARK

I.

P. GmNEY*

INTRODUCTION

[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps of the United States, but the State
may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography
class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history,
but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom
workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which the parochial
school children write, thus rendering them non-reusable. A State
may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but may not
pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. A State may
pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but
therapeutic services must be given in a different building;
speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the
sectarian school are forbidden, but the State may conduct
speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian
school. Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the parochial school,
such as in a trailer parked down the street. A State may give
cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of Statewritten tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it may not
provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in public school, but the
public school may release students during the day for religion
classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes
with its truancy laws.1

* Assistant Professor, Purdue University Department of Political Science. J.D., 1977, Villanova University; Ph.D., 1985, University of Michigan.

1. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2518-19 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
and footnotes omitted).
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No area of constitutional law is as muddled as that dealing with
state aid to religious-affiliated schools. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, quoted above, points out the current confused state of the law. This Article does not attempt to
explain how the law has reached its present state of affairs; that is,
it does not try to reconcile the irreconcilable.2 Instead, this Article
provides a political analysis of this area of the law by focusing on
the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court and
other governmental actors.
Section II is an overview of the major cases concerning aid to
parochial schools. Without attempting to explain the outcome of
these cases, this overview focuses on questions involving institutional relationships and judicial capabilities.
One of the frequently espoused tenets of judicial review is that,
absent special circumstances, the Court will pay deference to the
actions of the states and the federal legislative body.' Although the
Court has used the language of judicial deference, particularly
4
when it applies the secular purpose prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman,
Section III establishes that its analysis in the aid to parochial
school cases in fact has been quite searching.
Section IV examines the Supreme Court's review of lower federal
courts in the context of parochial school cases. It focuses on the
haphazard manner in which the Court accepts or rejects findings
by lower federal courts. Section IV also discusses whether some of
the standards that the Court has enunciated-in particular the two
branches of the excessive entanglement prong and the notion of
2. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1980). Dean Choper comments: "Without cataloguing the school aid
cases in detail, I think it is fair to say that application of the Court's three-prong test has
generated ad hoc judgments which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis." Id. at 680.
3. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("A legislature must have substantial lati-

tude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for
limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill.").
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the three-part Lemon test, the legislative act must have a
secular purpose, the primary effect of the statute must be neither to advance nor inhibit
religion, and the administration of the act must not foster an excessive entanglement between church and state. Id. at 612. See also infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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parochial schools being "pervasively sectarian"-are judicially
manageable standards.
Finally, Section V asserts that the Court might do well to modify
or perhaps even abandon its three-part Lemon test. It suggests
that the Court instead employ a standard of review similar to the
standard it uses in equal protection cases. Under such a standard,
the Court should generally pay deference to the actions of state
legislative bodies, but factors such as whether a majority is promoting its own interests at the expense of a minority should influence its level of review.

II.

AN OVERVIEW OF AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOL CASES

Everson v. Board of Education5 established an uncertain tone
for the Supreme Court in dealing with aid to parochial school
cases. Everson involved a New Jersey statute that allowed local
school boards to reimburse parents of both public and parochial
school students for transportation costs incurred in traveling to
and from school.6 Although Justice Black's majority opinion
stressed the need for a "wall of separation between church and
[s]tate, ''7 the Court upheld the statute in question as a valid general welfare provision.8 Consciously or not, the Court opened a
Pandora's box.9
Between Everson and Board of Education v. Allen ° the Court
decided a number of establishment clause cases,11 but none of

5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
8. Id. at 17-18.
9. In his dissent, Justice Rutledge noted: "Of course the cost of transportation promotes
the general cause of education and the welfare of the individual. So does paying all the other
items of educational expense." Id. at 50 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The idea remains that the
Court opened the floodgates of complicated and vexatious litigation by allowing some state
aid. In a recently decided case, Justice Brennan likened trying to limit judicially the percentage of the religious-school day which can be subsidized by the public school system to
letting "the genie out of the bottle." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3230
(1985).
10. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
11. In fact, some of the Court's most controversial decisions occurred during this period.
See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (banning Bible reading in
public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (banning official school prayer from
public schools). The Court also reviewed two "released time programs" in which public
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these cases dealt with aid to parochial schools. In Allen, however,
the Court once again considered a case concerning parochial school
aid. In that case it upheld a New York statute that required school
districts to purchase and loan textbooks to nonpublic school students upon the request of such students.12 The Allen decision thus
opened the Pandora's box a little wider, and was largely responsible for increased state measures to aid parochial schools.
Although subsequent cases would portray parochial schools in a
much different light, the Court in Allen was convinced that absent
a contrary finding in a particular case, parochial schools could segment the secular from the sectarian. Justice White's majority opinion noted that "this Court has long recognized that religious
schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education."1 Asserting that parochial schools have provided a "high
quality education" to a substantial portion of the American public, 14 Justice White stated that against this impressive background
the Court could not agree "either that all teaching in a sectarian
school is religious or that the processes of secular and religious
training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of
15
religion.'
Justice White also noted the lack of evidence in the record that
any textbooks loaned by the school district had in fact been used
by parochial schools to teach religion. 16 The Court portrayed the
legislative scheme as a general welfare statute and concluded that
Everson controlled.' 7 Although the Court recognized that buses
differ from books,' 8 it maintained that the statute's exclusion of
school students were released from regular class time to receive religious instruction. The

Court declared the program unconstitutional in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948), whereas it upheld the program in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952). The difference in outcome can be explained largely by the fact that in McCollum the
religious instruction occurred in the school, 333 U.S. at 205, while such instruction occurred
away from school in Zorach. 343 U.S. at 309.
12. 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
13. Id. at 245.
14. Id. at 247.
15. Id. at 248.
16. Id. (White stated, "[T]his case comes to us after summary judgment entered on the
pleadings.").
17. Id. at 241-42.
18. Id. at 244.
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religious books from the loan program and the requirement that
each book loaned be approved by public school authorities1 9 sufficiently ensured that the books would not be used for religious
purposes.2"
The Court in Allen relied upon a two-part test, first enunciated
in Everson, in applying establishment clause standards: the statute
in question must have a secular purpose, and its primary effect
must be neither to advance nor inhibit religion.21 Chief Justice
Burger, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 2 added a third requirement: the
statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with
23
religion.
In Lemon the Court reviewed state statutes from Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania. The Rhode Island statute required that the
state pay a salary supplement directly to nonpublic school teachers. 24 The Pennsylvania statute allowed the Superintendent of
Public Instruction to "purchase" specified "secular educational
services" from nonpublic schools. 25 Under these contracts the state
directly reimbursed nonpublic schools for expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional material.26 To receive reimbursement, the school had to maintain prescribed accounting
procedures that identified the separate cost of the special educational service.
In reviewing the Rhode Island statute, Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion noted that the district court concluded that parochial schools constituted an "integral part of the religious mission
of the Catholic Church. '28 Although the Supreme Court accepted
this particular finding, it dismissed rather summarily the district
court's finding that "concern for religious values did not inevitably
29
or necessarily intrude into the content of secular subjects.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 243.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id. at 609-10.
Id.
Id. at 616. Justice White responded:
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The district court's findings in Lemon largely reflected the Supreme Court's depiction of parochial schools in Allen, at least to
the extent that both reflected a belief that parochial schools could
keep the secular and the sectarian separate. With the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lemon, however, a much different view of parochial elementary and secondary schools began to emerge.3 0 After
describing the general religious administration and supervision of
these schools"' and quoting from the "Handbook of School Regulations," which describes the religious mission of Rhode Island parochial schools and the teachers' role in this mission,3 2 the Court concluded, contrary to Allen, that parochial school teachers would
have "great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral."33 Furthermore, the Court concluded that even with the best intentions, such
teachers "would find it hard to make a total separation between
secular teaching and religious doctrine."3'4 The Court did not say
that a teacher could not possibly make this distinction 5 but instead held that the state must be "certain" that state-paid teachers did not "inculcate religion. ' 's 6 In order to make such a determination, the Court said that the state must employ "comprehensive,

Accepting the District Court's observation in DiCenso that education is an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church . . . the majority
then interposes findings and conclusions that the District Court expressly abjured, namely, that nuns, clerics, and dedicated Catholic laymen unavoidably
pose a grave risk in that they might not be able to put aside their religion in
the secular classroom.
Id. at 666 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in Lemon and dissenting in DiCenso).
DiCenso, a Rhode Island district court case, struck down the school aid statute. DiCenso v.
Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30. Certainly Chief Justice Burger mixes the irrelevant with the relevant. For example,
the majority opinion noted that church schools are close to parish churches, thereby permitting "convenient access for religious exercises." 403 U.S. at 615. The opinion pointed out
that although on average only one-half hour of religious instruction per day occurs in these
schools (an irrelevant fact if one believes that religion permeates the school from the start),
"religiously oriented extracurricular activities" do take place. Id. The Court's analysis-if it
may be so denominated-continues at some length in this vein. Id. at 615-20.
31. Id. at 617.
32. Id. at 618. The Handbook has "the force of synodal law in the diocese." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Court virtually ignored the testimony of several teachers that "they did not inject
religion into their secular classes" on the grounds that "what has been recounted suggests
the potential if not actual hazards of this form of state aid." Id. at 618.
36. Id. at 619.
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discriminating and continuing state surveillance. 3 7 The price that
is paid for undertaking this surveillance, however-the "insoluble
paradox," to use Justice White's term3S-is the necessary violation
9
of the excessive entanglement prong created in Lemon.
After striking down both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes on these "administrative entanglement" grounds,4 0 the
Court discussed another branch of its new excessive entanglement
element-a political divisiveness rationale. 1 Ignoring the fact that
the Court itself, because of its opinions in Everson and Allen, was
at least partly responsible for the increasing efforts by the states to
aid parochial schools, the Chief Justice displayed great concern
that aid to religiously affiliated schools would begin to divide the
polity, and policy makers, along religious lines. The Chief Justice
suggested that the first amendment was designed to protect
against such an evil. 42 Although the Chief Justice offered no substantiation for his fears, he speculated that those who are of a particular religion would take a very hard stand politically in favor of
providing aid to parochial schools of their denomination, and those
of other religions would oppose such measures just as
43
vehemently.
In Tilton v. Richardson," a companion case to Lemon, the Court
upheld a provision in Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act
of 1963 that provided aid for the construction of purely secular
buildings and facilities on public and private college campuses. As
in Lemon, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Tilton once
again relied upon the district court's conclusion that none of the
four church-based institutions that were the subject of the lawsuit
had previously violated the statutory restriction to secular use.'5
The appellants sought to buttress their argument that religiousaffiliated schools were generally sectarian in nature by presenting a

37. Id.
38. Id. at 668 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in Lemon and dissenting in
DiCenso).
39. Id. at 619.
40. Id. at 620-22.
41. Id. at 622-25.
42. Id. at 622.
43. Id. at 622-23.
44. 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 680.
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profile of the "typical sectarian institution of higher education."4 6
Although the Court in Lemon had relied on a composite of the
parochial elementary and secondary schools in Rhode Island,4 7 in
Tilton Chief Justice Burger refused to rely on a "hypothetical pro-

file, "48 or so he claimed.
The Chief Justice's opinion in Tilton attempted to differentiate
the facts of the case from those of Lemon. In order to do so the
Chief Justice resorted to some very general statements about college students and religious-affiliated universities and colleges. He
speculated that "common observation" finds that college students.
are less susceptible to religious indoctrination than both elementary and secondary school students.4 9 Moreover, the skepticism of
the college student is "not an inconsiderable barrier to any attempt or tendency to subvert the congressional objectives and
'50
limitations.
Not only are college students different from their younger counterparts, but the image of parochial colleges differs sharply from
the "pervasively sectarian" portrayal given to all religious-affiliated
elementary and secondary schools. Burger wrote that "by their
very nature, college and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal
disciplines." 5 ' Furthermore, he added, "many" church-related institutions of higher education are characterized by a high degree of
academic freedom, and these schools "seek to evoke free and criti5' 2
cal responses from their students.
One variable in Supreme Court aid to parochial school cases,
therefore, is how certain it requires a state to be that religion is not
being inculcated in the schools. In Lemon the Court demanded ab-

46. Such a "composite" institution "imposes religious restrictions on admissions, requires
attendance at religious activities, compels obedience to the doctrines and dogmas of the
faith, requires instruction in theology and doctrine, and does everything it can to propagate
a particular religion." Id. at 682.
47. 403 U.S. 602, 615.
48. 403 U.S. 672, 682.
49. Id. at 686.
50. Id. Justice White's response to this argument is substantial. White's position is that
the selective perception of college students, by itself, cannot save this scheme. 403 U.S. 602,
668 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in both Lemon and Tilton).
51. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion).
52. Id.
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solute certainty; however, in Tilton Chief Justice Burger lowered
the standard and was willing to accept certain risks that religion
might be advanced.53 Because the risk of religious advancement
was lower-and acceptable-in Tilton, given the nature of the college and universities, "the necessity for intensive government surveillance is diminished and the resulting entanglement between
government and religion lessened."5 4 The Chief Justice then stated
that although inspections of the buildings paid for by federal funds
"may be necessary," these inspections apparently would be minimal. 5 Oddly enough, the opinion likened these inspections to those
in parochial grammar schools under compulsory education laws.2
This Article does not focus on the "college" cases; however, some
further consideration of what the Court has done in this area is
warranted. As noted above, in Tilton Chief Justice Burger allowed
a risk that religion might be inculcated because of the nature of
colleges and college students. Given the "skepticism" of college
students, however, the Court might accept not only a risk of religious promotion, but also a great deal of religious activity in public-sponsored programs or activities.
The Court has in fact arrived at this position. In Widmar v. Vincent,57 the Court refused to allow a public university to deny
school space to religious organizations when an equal-access policy
existed at the university. Widmar is particularly noteworthy because the religious groups bringing the lawsuit acknowledged that
53. Id. at 687. Chief Justice Burger commented:
Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these
church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood . . . that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk that
government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities.

Id.
54. Id. Two other "college cases" extended the principle of Tilton. In Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973), the Baptist College of Charleston had received aid from revenue bonds
issued pursuant to state authority. The Court upheld the validity of this state aid because
the assistance was limited to "secular aspects" of the college. Id. at 749. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976), involved state aid to private colleges through
annual noncategorical grants. The authorizing statute required grant recipients to file annual reports with a state agency and gave the agency authority to audit the colleges, if
necessary, to verify that the funds were not used for sectarian purposes. The Court upheld
this program, too. Id. at 766-67.
55. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687 (plurality opinion).
56. Id.
57. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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they might perform religious worship in the granted school space. s
This fact, however, apparently had no bearing on the Court's
decision.
In terms of universities and colleges, then, the Court has gone
well beyond a mere risk of religious promotion or inculcation under
public support. It has mandated the use of state buildings even
when these buildings will in fact be used for religious worship.
When the Court is speaking of elementary and secondary schools,
however, it has generally demanded absolute certainty that no reli59
gious promotion or inculcation will ever occur.
Returning to elementary and secondary school cases, the multifaceted statutory aid provisions in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist6 0 indicate the route that the
states appear to be pursuing. The aid in Nyquist involved: 1) direct money to a school for maintenance and repair of school facilities and for equipment to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of
enrolled pupils;"' 2) tuition reimbursements for low-income parents; 62 and 3) tax credits on tuition payments for parents not eligible for reimbursements.6 The Court struck down all three provisions as violative of the effects prong of*the Lemon test. 4 The
Court also relied on Tilton to strike down the maintenance and
repair provision, pointing out that nothing in the law limited such
work to those parts of the building that would be used for secular
purposes.6 5 The Court distinguished the tuition reimbursements

58. Justice White's dissent stressed this matter: "The regulation was applied to respondents' religous group, Cornerstone, only after the group explicitly informed the University
that it sought facilities for the purpose of offering prayer, singing hymns, reading scripture,
and teaching biblical principles." Id. at 283 (White, J., dissenting).
59. The one exception is Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980). See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
60. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
61. Id. at 762.
62. Id. at 764.
63. Id. at 765-66.
64. Id. at 798. In his dissent, Justice White argued that "the test is one of 'primary effect'
not any effect. The Court makes no attempt at that ultimate judgment necessarily entailed
by the standard heretofore fashioned in our cases." Id. at 823 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White also criticized the majority for striking down these statutes "on their face," given the
Court's recognition that many parochial schools do not fit the profile upon which the Court
based its analysis. Id. at 824.
65. Id. at 776-77.
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and tax credits from both Everson and Allen, pointing out that in
those two cases all parents benefited from the public provision,
while in Nyquist
only the parents of parochial school children so
6
benefited. 6

In Meek v. Pittenger,7 the Court continued to strike down state
efforts to provide various forms of aid to parochial school students
and parochial schools themselves. Meek involved: 1) auxiliary services such as counseling and testing by public school employees in
the nonpublic school for remedial students and the educationally
deprived;6 8 2) loans of secular textbooks to children in nonpublic
70
schools; 9 and 3) loans of instructional material and equipment.
The Court struck down all of these provisions except the textbook
loans portion. The Court considered the equipment to be a "large
volume of direct aid"7 1 given to these pervasively sectarian institutions, and under those circumstances a violation of the effects
7 2'
prong of the Lemon test.

The Court found the auxiliary services to be violative of the establishment clause on excessive entanglement grounds. Although
the Court recognized that the likelihood of the inadvertent foster73
ing of religion in something like an arithmetic class was slight,

it

nonetheless held that "a diminished probability of impermissible
conduct is not sufficient." 4 The Court then speculated that the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 781.
421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 354-55.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist commented:
One need look no further than to the majority opinion for a demonstration of
the arbitrariness of the percentage approach to primary effect. In determining
the constitutionality of the textbook loan program. . . the plurality views the
program in the context of the State's "well-established policy of lending textbooks free of charge to elementary and secondary students." But when it
comes time to consider the same Act's instructional materials and equipment
program, which is not alleged to make available to private schools any materials and equipment that are not provided to public schools, the majority strikes
down this program because more than 75% of the nonpublic schools are
church related or religiously affiliated.
Id. at 389 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 370-71.
74. Id. at 371.
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surveillance necessary to ensure the absence of religious inculcation from auxiliary service classes would violate the excessive en75
tanglement prong.
In addition to treating this part of excessive entanglement, the
Court also perceived a violation of the political divisiveness branch
76
of this element because continuing appropriations were involved.
Interestingly enough, Chief Justice Burger, the author of the excessive entanglement prong," argued in dissent that the rejection of
such aid might cause as much political divisiveness as granting aid
71
would.
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist questioned the
basis for the Court's conclusion that the dangers presented by a
state-subsidized guidance counselor were the same as those
presented by a state-subsidized chemistry teacher.7 9 Justice Rehnquist labeled such findings by the Court "ex cathedra pronouncements"8 0 and noted that the district court found the facts to be
exactly the opposite.8 1 Rehnquist then added that the Court's propensity to disregard findings of fact by district courts in establishment clause cases was at variance with "the established division of
responsibilities between trial and appellate courts in the federal
system.""2
Two years after Meek, the Court continued with its searching
and often speculative analysis of state attempts to aid parochial
schools. In Wolman v. Walter83 the Court addressed a rather imaginative effort by Ohio to provide aid through the following: 1)
loaned secular books;84 2) payment for testing and scoring certain
state required tests;85 3) provision of certain types of therapeutic
services on public school grounds; 86 4) loaned instructional materi-

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 372.
Id. at 372.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Choper, supra note 2, at 684.
Meek, 421 U.S. at 386.
Id. at 392 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 244-45.
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als and equipment; 87 and 5) authorized payment for school field
trips. 88 A three-judge district court panel held the statute constitutional in all respects.8 9 The Supreme Court affirmed as to the
books, testing and scoring, diagnostic services, and therapeutic services.90 The Court struck down the statutory provisions for loaning
instructional materials and equipment and for field trips,
however.9 1
The Court's treatment of the instructional materials contributes
to the present analysis of the institutional relationship between the
Court and the states. In Wolman, the state sought to distinguish
its statute from the one in Meek, in terms of the equipment issue,
by arguing that in Ohio the equipment was to be loaned to the
students, a situation thus presumably governed by Allen, while in
Meek the instructional materials were to be loaned directly to the
schools. 9 2 The Court pointed out that Ohio previously had loaned
instructional materials directly to schools, but had revised the statute after the Court's decision in Meek. It ruled that to uphold
the later statute in light of such changes "would exalt form over
substance."9 " Why the Court took this opportunity to disallow
statutory tailoring based on judicial precedents is puzzling. Certainly Wolman is not the first instance of such tailoring," nor will
it be the last. Moreover, the Court in Wolman criticized' a state for
attempting to follow the Court through this labyrinth.
The Court's discussion of state funding of field trips by parochial schools illustrates the speculative nature of the Court's analysis in this area and raises a very valid question about judicial competence, particularly at the Supreme Court level, to make certain

87. Id. at 248-49.
88. Id. at 252-53.
89. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1976), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
90. 433 U.S. at 255.
91. Id. One irony in this opinion is that the majority took special pains to point out that
the district court had found the dangers of providing diagnostic services to be insubstantial,
id. at 242, while simultaneously ignoring, in large part, the district court's finding of insubstantial dangers in all of the statutory schemes. 417 F. Supp. at 1125.
92. 433 U.S. at 250.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980). For a discussion of this case, see generally infra notes 111-17 accompanying text.
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determinations. Once again refusing to accept the findings of the
district court,9 6 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion differentiated
field trips from the bus trips in Everson because in Everson the
schools had no control over such trips, while in Wolman the
schools controlled the timing, frequency, and destination of field
trips.9 7 As a result, the Court treated the schools, not the students,
as the direct beneficiaries of the state aid, 98 thus violating the effects prong. In addition, the Court found an excessive entanglement violation. In the Court's view, it is the school teacher who
makes field trips "meaningful." 9 The Court described field trips in
this detail: "The experience begins with the study and discussion
of the place to be visited; it continues on location with the teacher
pointing out items of interest and stimulating the imagination; and
it ends with a discussion of the experience."100 The Court concluded that because the public school authorities could not adequately ensure "secular use of the field trip funds without close
supervision," 10 ' an excessive entanglement between church and
state would result.
How can the Court accurately describe school field trips with
any authority? The Court's "finding" concerning field trips alone
might not seem completely outrageous, but when coupled with a
host of other similarly unsubstantiated findings in this area, it
raises serious questions about the Court's treatment of these cases.
The Court has taken extended liberties in its analysis of the aid to
parochial school cases generally. Its "common observations" about
colleges and students at such institutions, its perceptions about the
pervasively sectarian nature of Rhode Island's parochial schools,
and its description of a teacher's role on a field trip illustrate this
point.
In 1970 the New York legislature appropriated public funds to
reimburse church-affiliated and secular nonpublic schools for performing various mandated services, including the administration,
the grading, and the compiling and reporting of the results of

96. 433 U.S. at 253.
97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 253-54.
101. Id. at 254-55.
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tests. 102 These tests were both state-prepared and teacher-prepared. The legislature stipulated that no funds were to be provided
for religious worship and instruction, 10 3 but the statute lacked a
provision requiring an audit of school financial records. In Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty,0 4 the
Court struck down this statute due to the lack of assurances that
internally prepared tests would be free of religious instructions. 10 5
In 1974 the New York legislature again tried to provide aid to
nonpublic schools, tailoring the new statute to meet the constitutional shortcomings found in Levitt. Under the new statutory
scheme, the state would not pay for the preparation, administration, or grading of teacher-prepared tests.1 06 In addition, the statute included an auditing provision.10 7 Despite these changes, a federal district court held this statute unconstitutional on the basis of
Meek. ° 1 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court vacated the
district court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court's more recent holding in Wolman. °9
On remand the district court upheld the statute. 0 In a novel fashion, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,'" which provides an extended history of the persistent state efforts to provide
aid to parochial schools.
In terms of "certainty" that a state-sponsored program will not
inculcate religious values, Regan represents a retreat from cases
such as Lemon. In Regan the Court noted that while most of the
questions on these exams would be multiple-choice, some might be

102. 1970 N.Y. LAWS ch. 3, § 2.
103. Id. at § 8.
104. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
105. Id. at 480.
106. 1974 N.Y. LAWS ch. 507, § 3. Instead, the state reimbursed nonpublic schools for
"state prepared examinations and reporting procedures." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at § 7.
108. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
109. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.

110. 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
111. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:119

in essay form112 and thus open to the possibility that religious considerations would influence the parochial teacher's grading policy.
The Court relied on the findings of the district court, however, and
found this risk to be "'minimal,' especially in light of the 'complete' state procedures designed to guard against serious inconsistencies in grading and any misuse of essay questions."' 3 The
Court held that "[t]he District Court was correct in concluding
that there was no substantial risk that the examinations could be
used for religious educational purposes."114
In Regan, the Court also displayed a rather novel approach to
the administrative branch of the excessive entanglement prong.
The Court directly quoted the district court's description of the
record-keeping and the state auditing procedure, which described a
series of contacts between church and state." 5 Past precedent
would have dictated a conclusion that a clear violation of the excessive entanglement prong had occurred. The Court, however, relied on the district court's findings that the "services for which the
private schools would be reimbursed are discrete and clearly iden-

112. Id. at 655-56.
113. Id. at 656 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F.
Supp. 1123, 1128-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
114. Id.
115. The portion of the district court's opinion quoted by the Supreme Court is as
follows:
Schools which seek reimbursement must "maintain a separate account or system of accounts for the expenses incurred in rendering" the reimbursement
services, and they must submit to the N.Y. State Commissioner of Education
an application for reimbursement with additional reports and documents prescribed by the Commissioner .... Reimbursable costs include proportionate
shares of the teachers' salaries and fringe benefits attributable to administration of the examination and reporting of State-required data on pupil attendance and performance, plus the cost of supplies and other contractual expenditures such as data processing services. Applications for reimbursement cannot
be approved until the Commissioner audits vouchers or other documents submitted by the schools to substantiate their claims .... The Statute further
provides that the State Department of Audit and Control shall from time to
time inspect the accounts of recipient schools in order to verify the cost to the
schools of rendering the reimbursable services. If the audit reveals that a
school has received an amount in excess of its actual costs, the excess must be
returned to the state immediately.
Id. at 659-60 (quoting 1974 N.Y.

LAws,

ch. 507, § 5).
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tifiable."" Furthermore, the Court concluded that the reimbursement process was "straightforward and susceptible to the rou1 17
tinization that characterizes most reimbursement schemes.'

Mueller v. Allen" 8 continued the trend toward deference in aid
to parochial school cases shown in Regan. In Mueller, the Court
considered Minnesota's policy of allowing taxpayers to take deductions on their state income taxes for tuition, textbooks, and transportation for schooling. 119 The Court upheld this provision, noting
that these deductions were only one of many deductions available
to taxpayers, and that the Court historically has given deference to
state statutory schemes. 120 Despite this purported historical deference, the Court was forced to distinguish Nyquist, which had invalidated a similar taxing scheme. The Court did so by explaining
12
that Nyquist was not a part of a "genuine" system of tax laws. '
The Court also reverted back to the direct benefit test,

22

which

posits that state aid is constitutional if parents and not schools
receive such aid, even though the Court had accorded this doctrine
rough treatment in Wolman. 123 Finally, despite the fact that only
one class of taxpayers would truly stand to benefit from these deductions-parents of nonpublic schoolchildren-the Court refused
to consider "the extent to which various classes of private citizens
claimed benefits under the law.'

24

The deference displayed in Regan and Mueller was short-lived.
In its 1985 term the Court decided two cases that once again have
frustrated state efforts to provide assistance to parochial schools
and their students. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 25 the
Court addressed the constitutionality of two teaching programs
held in parochial schools. One program, Shared Time, sent public
116. Id. at 660 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F.
Supp. 1123, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd sub nom. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
117. 444 U.S. at 660.
118. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
119. Id. at 391.
120. Id. at 396.
121. Id. at 396 n.6.
122. Id. at 397-99.
123. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
124. 463 U.S. at 401.
125. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
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school teachers to various parochial schools to teach remedial
courses. The second program, Community Education, entailed
teaching secular courses after school. Nonpublic school teachers
usually taught these classes.126
The notion of parochial schools being "pervasively sectarian,"
which had enjoyed a hiatus of sorts in Regan and Mueller, played
an important role in the Court's decision striking down the Grand
Rapids scheme. The Court quoted from the Parent Handbook of
one Catholic school that stated that the goal of a Catholic education was "[a] God oriented environment which permeates the total
'
The Court also quoted from a policy
educational program." 127
statement of the Christian schools that "it is not sufficient that the
teachings of Christianity be a separate subject in the curriculum,
but the Word of God must be an all-pervadingforce in the educafinding
tional program.' 12s The Court affirmed the district 1court's
29
sectarian.
"pervasively
that these institutions were
Justice Brennan's majority opinion treated the lack of evidence
of religious inculcation in an interesting fashion. He began this
analysis by stating in an odd fashion that "[t]he Court of Appeals
of course recognized that respondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrination." ' Brennan then added
the following caveat: "But the absence of proof of specific incidents
is not dispositive."'' He then examined the operation of the incentive structure and concluded that no party had any reason to recognize religious inculcation if it existed, nor did anyone have the
motive to report it to the proper authorities if inculcation did in
fact occur. In fact, the Court found that even the authorities
lacked a motive to obey the Constitution. 13 2 Presumably this lack

126. Id. at 3218-19.
127. Id. at 3220 (emphasis in opinion). Note that the Court does not indicate whether all
of the other Catholic schools had such a handbook, or whether what was in this handbook
had any semblance to reality.
128. Id. (emphasis in opinion).
129. Id. The district court decision is Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State v. School Dist., 546 F. Supp. 1071 (1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), afl'd sub
nom. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
130. 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3225 (1985) (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3225-26. The Court commented:
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of motivation could extend to all public officials in Grand Rapids
and elsewhere.
In Aguilar v. Felton,133 the companion case to Grand Rapids,
the Court reviewed a challenge to New York City's expenditure of
Title I money for remedial teaching of underprivileged students in
public and nonpublic schools. The Court's opinion relied quite
heavily on the circuit court's finding that the parochial schools
were pervasively sectarian, T although the Court did not point to
any specific indices of this as it had in Grand Rapids. Given the
conclusion that these schools were pervasively sectarian, the
Court's reasoning was rather routine: the need for comprehensive
state surveillance to prevent religious inculcation in turn would
create excessive entanglement. 35 The court of appeals had in fact
found that these schools were pervasively sectarian, but the Supreme Court ignored the fact that the district court reached the
opposite conclusion.136

When conducting a supposedly secular class in the pervasively sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the
content of the course to fit the school's announced goals. If so, there is no
reason to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be detected or
reported by students, by their parents, or by the school system itself. The students are presumably attending religious schools precisely in order to receive
religious instruction. After spending the balance of their school day in classes
heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they would have little motivation
or ability to discern improper ideological content that may creep into a Shared
Time or Community Education course. Neither their parents nor the parochial
schools would have cause to complain if the effect of the publicly-supported
instruction were to advance the school's sectarian mission. And the public
school system itself has no incentive to detect or report any specific incidents
of improper state-sponsored indoctrination. Thus, the lack of evidence of specific incidents of indoctrination is of little significance.
Id.
133. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
134. Id. at 3238. The court of appeals decision was Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d 48 (2d
Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985). A unanimous panel of
the Second Circuit held that "[t]he Establishment Clause. . . constitutes an insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds.

. .

to provide.

. .

services of the sort at issue here."

Id. at 49-50.
135. 105 S. Ct. at 3236-38.
136. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985). The district court stated:
The record before the Court includes uncontroverted evidence from . ..
schools where Title I services are provided that demonstrates that these insti-
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The Court treated the appellants' argument that the degree of
sectarianism will differ from school to school in a footnote. The
majority quoted from Judge Friendly's opinion for the Second Circuit that "[i]f any significant number of the Title I schools create
the risks described in Meek, Meek applies.' 137 Neither the court of
appeals nor the Supreme Court defined "significant number" or
the extent to which the risks identified in Meek would have to be
present.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Aguilar focused on yet another district court finding that the majority ignored-the fact that for 14
years, as of 1980, the program in question had operated without a
single complaint of religious inculcation. 13 Justice O'Connor's
opinion also pointed out that the majority's concern for comprehensive surveillance of the public school teachers was greatly exaggerated. 39 Again, she relied on the New York City experience: the
administrators found minimal surveillance of the program to be
sufficient. 40
Aguilar is the most recent of the major Supreme Court cases
dealing with aid to religiously affiliated schools. As noted earlier,
no effort has been made to reconcile these cases; Justice Rehnquist's depiction of the law as it now stands seems to capture fully
the Supreme Court's uncertain path. The following sections examine some rationales for this confusion.

tutions do not have the characteristics of the pervasively sectarian schools described by the Supreme Court. The evidence shows that those nonpublic
schools (1) do not restrict the admission of students on religious grounds; (2)
do not restrict the hiring of teachers on religious grounds; (3) do not attempt
to compel their students to accept or obey the doctrines of the sponsoring
church or religious organization; (4) offer separate programs of secular and religious instruction and do not impose religious restrictions on the content of the
instruction offered. Furthermore, the numerous affidavits of Title I teachers
and professionals show that these public employees do not perceive a 'dominant sectarian mission' and have not been subject to religious pressures or influences in the parochial schools in which they work.
Id. at 1262-63 (citations to affidavits omitted).
137. 105 S. Ct. at 3238 n.8 (quoting Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d 48, 70 (2d Cir. 1984),
aff'd sub nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985)).
138. Id. at 3244-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 489 F. Supp. 1248, 1265 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd sub nom. Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Aguilar
v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985)).
139. 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 3247 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

1986]
III.

STATE AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
JUDICIAL OVERREACHING IN AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOL CASES

Many instances of judicial overreaching mark this area of state
aid to religious-affiliated schools. Although some state efforts have
been upheld, the great majority have not. Seldom has the Court
made such minimal efforts to uphold the constitutionality of state
statutes than in the aid to religious-affiliated school cases. If the
Court had been more consistent in its holdings, or if it had not
praised the state for pursuing proper secular efforts while systematically striking down these efforts, talk about a government by judiciary in this area might seem more natural.
On one level the Court gives great deference to the actions of
state legislative bodies when reviewing attempts to aid parochial
schools and their students. When applying the three-part Lemon
test, the Court has been very quick to find valid secular purposes
that would otherwise justify the legislative enactment. The Court
thus ostensibly pays deference to the legislative bodies that have
enacted the law. In Mueller,1 4 1 Justice Rehnquist explained this
approach by arguing that the Court needed to spend little time
examining whether a secular purpose existed because the Court
14 2
was reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states.
This very deferential application of the secular purpose prong
has allowed the Court to appear as if it is not attributing unconstitutional motives to the states. Its very searching analysis under the
other two parts of the Lemon test, however, indicate that the
Court does exactly the opposite. Moreover, the deference accorded
under the secular purpose prong has served to mask the Court's
very intrusive efforts under the effects and excessive entanglement
prongs.
One way that the Court has failed to defer to the states is that it
has treated all parochial schools together, even though the Court
itself has recognized that not all schools within a given jurisdiction
are similar. 4 3 If the Court truly wanted to review the actions of
the state in the most positive light, it would differentiate between
schools, saving as much of the state's efforts as possible by such
methods as becoming sensitive to differences in schools and school
141. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
142. Id. at 394.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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programs. Instead, the Court has relied on a very general profile of
sectarian schools. Such reliance is problematic for several reasons.
First, profiles themselves do not always reflect the facts of particular cases. Second, the profile that the Court has used is fifteen
years old and based on "facts" from a school system in a state that
' 4
is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. The "Sister Mary Ignatius '"
profile that the Court used in Lemon has continued to be the profile used in subsequent cases. 145 The use of this profile is largely
responsible for the Court's tendency to view the schools in question as "pervasively sectarian." In Grand Rapids School District, 46 for example, the Court made several references to a parent
handbook from one of the Catholic schools in the city. The handbook stated that the objective was to have religion permeate the
entire school situation in a Catholic education. By categorizing all
Catholic schools on the basis of a purported characterization of one
school, the Court does little to save the constitutionality of a state
educational scheme. Moreover, as many in the education field can
undoubtedly attest, school catalogues are not always the most reliable sources of information about school policies.
Given this blanket treatment of all Roman Catholic schools in
Grand Rapids, the Court's attempt at differentiation between
schools in Aguilar147 seems surprising. As noted earlier, the Court's
reliance on Judge Friendly's opinion regarding the application of
Meek 48 may indicate a more deferential standard, perhaps even a
school-by-school approach. This result seems unlikely, however,
even though any serious effort to uphold the constitutionality of
state schemes should attempt to differentiate between the schools
144. The reference here, of course, is to Christopher Durang's irreverent play, "Sister
Mary Ignatius Explains It All For You," which depicts a crazed nun's interpretation of the
universe through Catholic dogma. It also offers a very wicked picture of life (and death) in a
Catholic grammar school.
145. For example, in Meek the Court used this type of analysis, and stated:
The church-related elementary and secondary schools that are the primary
beneficiaries ... typify such religion-pervasive institutions. The very purpose
of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education; the teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation of
religious values and belief.
421 U.S. at 366.
146. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
147. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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affected. The Supreme Court has not attempted such differentiation. Instead, it imputes an unconstitutional scheme, either from a
brochure from one school or, more generally, from an outdated
perception of Roman Catholic education.
A related shortcoming in the Court's analysis is the blunt dividing line it has drawn between colleges on the one hand, and primary and secondary schools on the other. The Court generally has
depicted the latter as "pervasively sectarian" and the former as
secular. 14 9 The Court also frequently uses a blunt categorization in
comparing students. Employing "common observation," a high
school senior is likely to have much more in common with a college
freshman than with a first grader in terms of impressionability,
skepticism, and so on. The Court's analysis, however, treats primary and secondary school students identically and treats college
students completely differently. The end result is a very counterintuitive depiction of young people. If the Supreme Court seriously
sought to uphold state actions in this area, it might well employ a
continuum based on the impressionability of students at various
age levels. Instead, the Court presumes that college students are
more skeptical than other students and thus permits only college
students to be exposed to a higher risk of religious inculcation.
The Court has virtually ignored any evidence submitted by administrators and legislators alike pertaining to their educational
objectives. This fact further indicates that the Court pays little
50
deference to state efforts. In Aguilar,1
for example, the record
contained uncontroverted testimony by program administrators
and educators that no religious inculcation ever occurred. In addition, the record showed that for 19 years no complaints that religion had crept into the programs were ever received.' 51 Although
the Court should not merely follow what state actors say about
their own policies and actions, such input at least deserves some
judicial consideration. In the aid to parochial school cases, however, the Court has accorded little weight to the evidence and findings presented by the state. The Court has dismissed summarily
the testimony of city and state officials and the absence of com-

149. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
150. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
151. Id. at 3244-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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plaints about religious inculcation. The Court assumes that state
actors have neither the ability nor the motivation to recognize and
report religious inculcation. 152 Imagine the Court applying this
kind of analysis to an area of constitutional law such as racial discrimination; under the kind of analysis used in the aid to parochial
school cases, the Court could decide otherwise-difficult cases like
Palmer v. Thompson 53 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro54
politan Housing Development Corp.1
rather easily. It could simply state that racial discrimination surely existed and refuse to
hear contrary evidence presented by city officials because city officials had neither the motivation nor the ability to detect
discrimination.
This lack of deference given to state efforts emerges as a striking
feature of the aid to parochial school cases. The Court makes minimal efforts to portray state actions in a favorable light. Its concern
about preventing constitutional violations does not explain adequately the cursory treatment accorded state schemes to aid parochial schools. The Court displays an implicit distrust of the states
in aid to parochial schools issues. The Court seems to perceive legislators as unable or unwilling to turn a deaf ear to those clamoring
for aid to parochial schools. 155 The Court seems to think that
rather than resist the efforts of parochial school lobbyists, legislators will instead pass constitutionally infirm measures. Perhaps the
Court thinks that legislators want the Court to take the political
heat on this matter."" If not, then perhaps the Court is being quite

152. See supra note 132.
153. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In Palmer, the city of Jackson, Mississippi, was ordered to desegregate its public parks, auditoriums, golf course, city zoo, and public pool. The city
agreed to desegregate all but the pool, and in fact the city council closed the pool, claiming
high operating costs. The Court found no unlawful discrimination in the city's actions. Id. at
218-19.
154. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Village Plan Commission declined to
re-zone land from single-family units to multiple-family dwellings. A group of blacks characterized the commission's decision as racially motivated. The Supreme Court, however, ruled
that no proof of racial discrimination existed. Id. at 254-55.
155. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797 n.55 (1973) ("As some 20% of the total school population in New York attends private and parochial schools, the constituent base supporting
these programs is not insignificant.").
156. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 487 (1979) ("Indeed, there is
reason to believe that some legislative bodies have welcomed judicial activism with respect
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sensitive to the rise and volatility of single-issue interest groups. 157

Whatever the reason, if the Court does not trust state actors in
this area it should say so, as it has in analogous situations, by applying a strict scrutiny standard. The present analysis not only
adds little to the logical progression of the law, but it also poisons
relations between the states and the Court. That a much greater
political backlash against the Court has not occurred to date is
remarkable.
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LOWER FEDERAL
COURTS

A review of the aid to parochial school cases reveals a rather

haphazard relationship between lower federal courts and the Supreme Court. 15 Two recent cases exemplify this relationship. In
Grand Rapids, 59 the Court accepted the district court's findings
that the schools in question were pervasively sectarian and stressed
the importance of such findings by the lower court. In Aguilar,6'
the companion case to Grand Rapids, the Court completely ig-

nored the findings of the district court, which had concluded that

to a subject so inherently difficult and so politically sensitive that the prospect of others
confronting it seems inviting.").
157. Many political scientists have noted this trend of the rising power of single-issue

interest groups. See T. Lowi,

THE END OF LIBERALISM

(2d. ed. 1979). The "older" view of

interest group influence downplayed the power of interest groups. See R. BAUER, L DE SOLA
POOL, & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963). Now the dominant
thought is that legislators are often held hostage to a myriad of single-issue interest groups,
which will attempt to make or break a legislator on the basis of only one issue, or perhaps
even one vote. Most political scientists concur that the rise of single-issue interest groups
has changed completely the nature of American politics. The rise in political influence of
religious organizations -is also a noteworthy phenomenon in the political scene. Perhaps the
Supreme Court is simply adapting its review to protect legislators from their constituents,
but the Court has treated the actions of state legislators much differently-and with much
less deference-in this area of aid to religious affiliated schools.
158. See Serritella, Tangling With Entanglement: Toward a ConstitutionalEvaluation
of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS. 143, 147 (1981) ("Although Lemon
requires a broad evaluation, it has resulted in lower court holdings that are nearly as variable as the facts being considered.").
159. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
160. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
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the schools in question were not pervasively sectarian.' 6 ' The
Court relied instead on the fact that the court of appeals had
found these schools to be pervasively sectarian. 6 " Justice Rehnquist has complained that the Court has systematically ignored the
findings of lower federal courts in establishment clause cases,163
but this is an overstatement of what the Court has done. In reality,
the Court has accepted some lower court findings and has dis64
missed others, a result even harder to comprehend or justify.

161. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248,
1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd
sub noma. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
162. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
163. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 392 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
164. In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), Justice O'Connor attempted to fashion a different role for district courts to
play in the establishment clause area. One of the premises of O'Connor's argument was that
the effect prong does not "require invalidation of a government practice merely because it in
fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion." Id. at 691.
Instead, O'Connor argued that "[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion."
Id. at 692. O'Connor seems to be saying that appearance supercedes reality. With this as
background, O'Connor then turned to what the district court had found as facts:
that the creche has a religious content, that it would not be seen as an insignificant part of the display, that its religious content is not neutralized by the
setting, that the display is celebratory and not instructional and that the city
did not seek to counteract any possible religious message. These findings do
not imply that the creche communicates government approval of Christianity.
Id. at 693. O'Connor then pointed out, however, that the district court had found that the
government was understood to place its imprimatur on the religious content of the creche.
Justice O'Connor responded:
But whether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is
not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may
help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question
to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts. The District Court's conclusion concerning the effect of Pawtucket's display of its
creche was in error as a matter of law.
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145

The tests that the Supreme Court has employed, 6 5 particularly
in terms of defining "pervasively sectarian,"'' 6a offer one possible
explanation for this confusion in the treatment of lower court findings. Lemon v. Kurtzman167 first introduced the characterization of
a school as pervasively sectarian. In Lemon, the Court relied on
several different factors in determining that these particular
schools were pervasively sectarian."' Since Lemon, the Court has
treated all elementary and secondary parochial schools exactly as F
they were the schools scrutinized in Rhode Island in 1971.169 In
Meek, 1 70 the Court noted the standards that the appellants sought
to apply to determine if the schools were pervasively sectarian. 17'
In Aguilar, however, the Court rejected the district court's attempt
to employ Meek. 17 2 As a result of these conflicting rulings, lower
courts are left with very little guidance. They must determine
whether parochial schools are pervasively sectarian, yet the Supreme Court has given them virtually no standards to apply. The

165. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court set forth these guidelines for
determining administrative excessive entanglement: 1) the character and purpose of the institutions that are benefited, 2) the nature of the aid that the State provides and 3) the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. Id. at 615.
166. This discussion is not meant to exclude a discussion of other unworkable Court standards. For example, if the Court had taken the primary effect prong more literally, similar
problems would arise in determining what was a primary effect as opposed to a secondary
effect.
167. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
168. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
170. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
171. The appellants claimed that state money was being provided to religious schools
that:
(1) are controlled by churches or religious organizations, (2) have as their purpose the teaching, propagation and promotion of a particular religious faith,
(3) conduct their operations, curriculums and programs to fulfill that purpose,
(4) impose religious restrictions on admissions, (5) require attendance at instruction in theology and religious doctrine, (6) require attendance at or participation in religious worship, (7) are an integral part of the religious mission of
the sponsoring church, (8)have as a substantial or dominant purpose the inculcation of religious values, (9) impose religious restrictions on faculty appointments, and (10) impose religious restrictions on what the faculty may
teach.
Id. at 356.
172. 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3236 (1985). The Court added to the confusion, however, by indicating that the standards in Meek are somehow applicable without explaining how. Id. at 3238
n.8; see also supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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safest course for a lower federal court is to treat all parochial
schools from grades one through twelve as "pervasively sectarian,"
notwithstanding the special circumstances of a particular case.
Most lower courts have made such determinations because of the
Supreme Court's selectivity in upholding lower court findings on
this question. The test of whether a school is "pervasively sectarian" is thus not really a standard. 17 3 Instead, it is a conclusory
label describing almost all religious-affiliated schools below the college level. Whether a workable standard for making such determinations could be employed is beyond the scope of this Article. The
foregoing discussion merely illustrates the marked deficiency in the
present standard.
Similar problems arise under other Court standards in this area.
Exactly what constitutes administrative excessive entanglement is
by no means clear; again, the Supreme Court has offered little
guidance to lower courts. 71 In some respects, Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan 17 5 is the exception.
Before Regan the Court portrayed state surveillance of pervasively
sectarian schools as automatic excessive entanglement. In Regan
the Court labeled the services for which the private schools would
be reimbursed "discrete and clearly identifiable."'1 7 ' The Court described the reimbursement scheme itself as "straightforward and
susceptible to the routinization that characterizes most reimburse-

173. A further problem exists in terms of judicial capacity to make such determinations.
Unless a judge actually spent some time in a religious-affiliated school, his finding as a matter of fact that a certain school was pervasively sectarian should be obviously suspect. The
"objective" criteria (the number of crosses, the number of religious teachers, and so on)
seem to offer little. For a discussion of judicial capacity see generally D. HOROWITZ, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
174. See Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980). Judge Ripple stated:
The degree of entanglement deemed 'excessive' often appears to be the product of personal judgments about certain religions and their institutions by a
decision-maker who may or may not have any real exposure to the particular
sect in question. The Justices have often based their conclusions on factual
assumptions upon which the record is either silent or to the contrary.
Id. at 1218.
175. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
176. Id. at 660 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F.
Supp. 1123, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 445 U.S. 646 (1980)).
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ment schemes." 1 7 Such descriptions are not standards, however,

but only conclusions.
The amount of risk of religious inculcation that the Court will
tolerate further complicates the analysis. If the state can take a
risk that religion may be inculated-that is, if a religious-affiliated
college is involved-then the Court may not find an excessive entanglement. Conversely, if the Court mandates absolute certainty-that is, if a religious-affiliated grammar school or high
school is involved-then a finding of an excessive entanglement is
quite likely to ensue. Regan again surfaces as the difficult exception.17 8 Before Regan the Court seemed to indicate that absolutely
no risk of religious inculcation could occur in a state-funded activity, at least if the activity involved elementary and secondary
schools.1 79 Now, some risk seems constitutionally permissible, at
least for certain activities.180 Questions, however, persist: what activities? what kind of surveillance? and what standards must
courts apply?
The political divisiveness branch of the excessive entanglement
prong has recently come under attack,81 but for the wrong reasons.
Political divisiveness is not a meaningful judicial standard, either.
Moreover, courts are not in an appropriate position to make these
kinds of determinations. The Court has stated correctly that the
mere filing of a lawsuit does not constitute political divisiveness,182
but it has set no further standards. In addition, the Court has assumed that divisiveness will occur along religious lines without
presenting substantiating empirical evidence for such a
statement. 183
177. 444 U.S. at 660.
178. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
179. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971).
180. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
181. "Guessing the potential for political divisiveness inherent in a government practice is
simply too speculative an enterprise." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also noted in dissent in Donnelly: "Of course,
the Court is correct to note that we have never held that the potential for divisiveness alone
is sufficient to invalidate a challenged governmental practice.
"Id.
at 703 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
182. "A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, however, create the
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement." Lynch, 465
U.S. at 684.
183. Id.
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In summary, lower federal courts are in an undesirable position
in deciding aid to parochial school cases. The Supreme Court has
set forth certain standards-administrative excessive entanglement, political divisiveness, pervasively sectarian-without explaining to lower courts or administrators what these standards
mean or how they should be applied. In a number of instances the
Court has ignored certain findings of fact without an adequate explanation. In terms of institutional relationships, this area of aid to
religious-affiliated schools is fraught with perils. The Supreme
Court has run roughshod over both lower courts and political actors. Section V considers possible solutions to these problems.
V.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

Members of the Court are obviously dissatisfied with the threepart Lemon test,""' but apparently not enough to call for its demise. The Court could take one of three different directions in
these aid to parochial school cases. On one extreme it could heed
Justice Stevens' cry for sanity and attempt to patch up or perhaps
completely rebuild the wall of separation between church and
state.185 The other extreme position is implicit in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wallace.le" Under a valid reading of
that opinion, a state constitutionally could promote religion in
schools in a wide variety of ways.1 87 This Article argues for the
third possible approach: a new position between these two
extremes.
Under this new position the Court should pay due respect to the
efforts of the states but also should provide a searching analysis of
the states' actions if the circumstances warrant. The closest analogy is the Court's analysis in the equal protection area, even
though the Court's analysis in that area is not the model of clarity.
In addition to two clearly established standards, rational basis and
strict scrutiny, some members of the Court have recognized a mid-

184. See, e.g., id.
185. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2518-19 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
187. The thrust of Justice Rehnquist's novel opinion is that the actions of the early framers actually evince a desire to promote religion in a number of aspects of public life. Id.
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dle level of scrutiny. 188 Justice Marshall also has suggested that the
189
Court has on occasion employed a sliding scale analysis.
When deciding aid to parochial school cases, the Court should
pay more than lip service deference to the states. If the state
claims that its actions do not aid or promote religion, then the
Court generally should accept these findings, absent proof to the
contrary. Exactly what would constitute such proof to the contrary
is difficult to say in the abstract."9" This is not meant to allow the
three-part Lemon test 91 to come in through the back door, however. Legislative findings that a state's actions do not violate the
establishment clause generally should be accepted by the judiciary,
again, subject to evidence to the contrary. 9 2
Thus far, however, this Article does not fully detail the role the
Court should play in aid to parochial school cases. As in the equal
protection area, the Court should be sensitive to special circumstances and fashion its scrutiny accordingly. In the area of equal
protection analysis, this sensitivity has meant that the Court will
apply a strict scrutiny standard to legislation that involves a fundamental right, 193 or a quasi-fundamental right,19 4 or that has a
detrimental effect on a suspect class 195-or a quasi-suspect class. 196

188. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
189. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. Although this Article suggests that the Court abandon its three-part test, in all likelihood this will not occur. The Court must therefore make serious attempts to consider such
matters as whether use of an outdated and biased profile of parochial schools should be
continued, whether individual schools should be treated separately, and whether current
Court standards are workable at all.
191. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
192. In outlining his own version of a desirable establishment clause standard, James Serritella argues that one must first determine whether an activity is "religious." Serritella,
supra note 158, at 155. Serritella would have the institutions themselves make the determination whether a particular activity is religious, however. Id. at 155.
Serritella's position is problematic. Enough of a potential problem of foxes guarding
chicken coops already exists, yet Serritellas proposal takes this to an extreme. The principle
proposed by this Article, allowing the legislature to make such determinations, is far
sounder.
193. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to the
right to travel interstate).
194. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to classifications according to alienage).
196. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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In the area of providing aid to parochial schools, the Court should
develop a similar type of analysis. It should look at whether an
analogously suspect class exists. More particularly, it should determine whether the majority is providing aid to the majority, or
whether the majority is providing aid to a minority. If the majority
is benefiting itself, then a heightened scrutiny is appropriate. If,
however, the majority is providing purportedly secular aid to a religious minority, then the Court's level of scrutiny should be similar
197
to the rational basis test.
Consider this example: In State X, twenty percent of the population is Roman Catholic, seventy percent is made up of various
Protestant denominations, 9 ' Jews constitute nine percent of the
population, and Moslems one percent. Five percent of the students
in the state are educated at nonpublic schools, all of which are Roman Catholic. The state legislature in X provides certain kinds of
aid to parochial schools for purportedly secular purposes. Under
the scheme presented here, the Court should apply an analysis
akin to a rational basis test when reviewing the state's actions. If
the state maintains that it provides support for educational services and not for religious purposes, then absent special circum-

197. John Hart Ely has taken a comparable position in arguing for a more deferential
Court review of affirmative action programs. He states:
There is no danger that the coalition that makes up the white majority in our
society is going to deny whites generally their right to equal concern and respect. Whites are not going to discriminate against all whites for reasons of
racial prejudice, and neither will they be tempted generally to underestimate
the needs and deserts of whites relative to those, say, of blacks or to overestimate the costs of devising a more finely tuned classification system that would
extend to certain whites the advantages they are extending to blacks ....
The argument does not work the other way around, however: similar reasoning
supports no insistence that our representatives cannot hurt themselves, or the
majority on whose support they depend, without at the same time hurting
others as well. Whether or not it is more blessed to give than to receive, it is
surely less suspicious.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170 (1980).
198. This example is not meant to overlook the fact that Roman Catholics might constitute a majority under some standards because Protestant sects are divided. In other words,
calling Protestants a majority when the largest sect might have fewer members than the
Catholic Church may be misleading. On the other hand, considering Catholics a majority
when they comprise twenty percent of the population of a state and Protestants comprise
seventy percent seems even more misleading, even if the largest Protestant sect has fewer
members than the Catholic Church.
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stances-such as direct and convincing evidence to the contrary or
a majority singling out its own religion for special treatment-the
Supreme Court should not overrule this determination. The Court
should not act because aid is not going to a religious, and probably
political, majority, but to a religious minority-Roman Catholics in
this instance. 19 9 The argument is based on the premise the majority can be trusted not to promote the religion of a religious
minority.
The argument would be different, and the Court's analysis similarly changed, if some facts were different. For example, if Roman
Catholics constituted a majority, or almost a majority, of the population of X, aid that benefited Roman Catholics should be subject
to a higher degree of scrutiny. Likewise, if all of the schools in X
were Catholic except for one that was Moslem, and the aid was
tailored so that only Catholic schools benefited, a higher judicial
scrutiny would again be appropriate.
One might criticize this majority-minority distinction, arguing
that legislators might easily succumb to the pressures of parochial
school lobbyists or that the state legislature, containing few nonbelievers, might seek to promote religion in general. These arguments, however, imply that whenever the possibility of a constitutional violation and the possibility of legislators succumbing to
interest group pressure exist, the Court should employ the widely
varying and questionable analysis that it has used in the parochial
school cases over any other type of constitutional analysis. Opponents of a different analysis should note that the choice is not between a test which "politicizes" the protections of the first amendment and one which absolutely guarantees those protections. The
choice is between a test developed in a contradictory line of decisions and one which is more in tune with the Court's other, more
acceptable analysis.
Although the Court seems wedded to its three-pronged Lemon
standard, 0 0 several recent opinions indicate that this rigidity
might be subject to change. For example, in Larson v. Valente,.2 0 a
199. In fact, this approach aids in deciphering cases like Everson, Allen, and Mueller.
The fact that all parents purportedly benefit indicates that no preference for either the
majority or the minority exists.
200. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3236-38 (1985).
201. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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case dealing with a state determination of which religious organizations were subject to state reporting requirements, the Court employed a strict scrutiny analysis and then the Lemon test.2 0 2 Likewise, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly' 3 used
an equal protection analysis.20 4 Finally, the Court's recent decision
on silent prayer, Wallace v. Jaffree,205 is noteworthy for this analysis. Although the Court struck down Alabama's efforts to institute
a moment of silence in the schools, presumably a majority of the
Court would uphold a state statute where prayer was not such an
evident intention of the legislative body. Justices O'Connor and
Powell both referred to striking down "sham" statutes, those that
masked a religious intention;20 6 but a majority of the Court also
indicated a willingness to give deference to the states in such legislative endeavors. 0 7
The analysis thus far essentially concerns the Court's relationship with state legislative bodies and state executive officers. Attempting to remedy the Supreme Court's relationship with lower
federal courts in this area depends on a serious re-working of the
Lemon standards. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has
both ignored findings of fact by lower courts and enunciated unworkable standards. In many respects the Court's actions are
traceable to the Lemon standards themselves. Without a change in
these standards, the inconsistent relationship between levels of the
judicial branch will remain.

202. The Court found that the state's requirement that religious organizations soliciting
more than fifty percent of their funds from non-members was gerrymandered to strike at
the Unification Church. Id. at 254.
203. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). This case involved the constitutionality of Pawtucket, Rhode Island's, nativity scene. Id. at 670-71. Although the Court
employed the Lemon test, it did so in a very loose manner, which allowed the Court to
uphold this longstanding city practice. Id. at 687.
204. Justice O'Connor stated:
The Larson standard, I believe, may be assimilated to the Lemon test in the
clarified version I propose. Plain intentional discrimination should give rise to
a presumption, which may be overcome by a showing of compelling purpose
and close fit, that the challenged government conduct constitutes an endorsement of the favored religion or a disapproval of the disfavored.
Id. at 684 n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
206. 105 S. Ct. at 2494 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 2490.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

That area of constitutional law concerning the question of permissible state aid to parochial schools is clearly in a shambles. This
Article has not attempted to explain the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, but instead has sought to highlight the perceived
shortcomings in the institutional relationships between the Supreme Court and the states and between the Supreme Court and
lower courts. In spite of the Supreme Court's deferential review
under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, the Court actually has paid very little deference to the states. In terms of the
Court's relationship with lower courts, two observations emerge
from a review of the cases in this area: 1) the Court's inconsistent
use of lower court findings; and 2) the enunciation of standards
that seem beyond judicial capabilities, particularly in their present
form. It is suggested that the Court employ an analysis in this area
akin to what the Court employs in equal protection cases. Because
a religious majority is unlikely to subsidize the promotion of the
religious efforts of a religious minority, the Court should generally,
absent special circumstances, pay deference to the actions of the
states in this area.

